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We acknowledge the tradition of custodianship and 
law of the Country on which the University of Sydney 
campuses stand. We pay our respects to those who 
have cared and continue to care for Country.
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In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 
1325). This signalled a major shift in the governance of 
international peace and security, in that it recognised 
women as a specific population group affected by 
conflict.1 The resolution recognised that women 
and girls experience violence as a result of armed 
conflict in unique and complex ways by virtue of 
their gender, and that they have an inherent right to 
participate in peace negotiations and reconstruction 
efforts that directly affect their lives.2
The nine Women, Peace and Security (WPS) resolutions 
that followed UNSCR 1325 expand on this premise 
and construct the framework to support these and 
other related principles. These resolutions cover a 
wide range of topics under the rubric of peace and 
security, from operationalising WPS, developing 
indicators, and measuring outcomes (UNSCR 2106, 
UNSCR 1889, UNSCR 2122, UNSCR 2242, and UNSCR 
2493) to recognising the weaponisation of sexual 
violence in armed conflict and developing strategies to 
combat it, and increasing access to justice for victims 
of sexual violence (UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888, UNSCR 
1960, and UNSCR 2467). 
1   Miller, B., M. Pournik, and A. Swaine (2014) ‘Women in peace and security through United Nations Security resolution 1325: Literature review, content 
analysis of National Action Plans, and implementation’ PeaceWomen; Tryggestad, T.L. (2009) ‘Trick or treat? The UN and implementation of Security Council 
resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 15(4): 539-557. 
2   Miller, Pournik and Swaine, ‘Women in peace and security’, 6; Pratt, N., and S. Richter-Devroe (2011) ‘Critically examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and 
Security’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13(4): 489-503, 490-491. 
3   Jacevic, M.M. (2018) ‘WPS, states, and the National Action Plans’, In S.E. Davies and J. True (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and 
Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 274-289, 274.
4   See UNSC (2004) ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, and UNSC (2005) ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’.
5   Jacevic, ‘WPS, states, and the National Action Plans’, 274.
6   Though we do not consider them in this report, Regional Action Plans (RAPs) also exist; as of the time of writing, there were 11 RAPs (WILPF 2019). RAPs, 
in contrast to NAPs, are intended as means of consolidating regional cooperation in furtherance of the agenda. They play a vital role by signalling a regional 
commitment to furthering the rights of women, and encouraging member states to follow through on or adopt their own NAPs; see True, J., and M. Mintrom 
(2001) ‘Transnational networks and policy diffusion: The case of gender mainstreaming’, International Studies Quarterly, 45(1): 27-57, 43, 48). However, 
RAPs can also suffer from a general lack of specificity regarding timelines and the roles of involved parties or agencies; little to no references to funding 
allocation or monitoring and evaluation indicators; and a tendency of policymakers to prioritise rhetorical commitments over substantive action. See Hudson, 
N.F. (2013) National and Regional Implementation of Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security: Background Paper for Global Review 
Meeting, paper presented at the UN Women Global Technical Review Meeting: Building accountability for implementation of Security Council resolutions on 
Women, Peace and Security. 
7   It is also worth noting that not all states or regional organisations go down the route of a NAP; some states, such as Colombia and Thailand, instead choose 
to institutionalise the principles of WPS through their domestic gender equality legislation; see Jacevic, ‘WPS, states, and the National Action Plans’, 274. 
8   Björkdahl, A. and J. Mannergren Selimovic (2015) ‘Translating UNSCR 1325 from the global to the national: Protection, representation and participation in 
the National Action Plans of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda’, Conflict, Security and Development, 15(4): 311-335.
National Action Plans (NAPs) are a strategic tool 
for policymakers to operationalise and translate 
the international mandates of the WPS agenda 
into the domestic context.3 However, despite the 
adoption of UNSCR 1325 in the year 2000, NAPs 
did not become a UN priority until the release of 
two Security Council presidential statements, in 
2004 and 2005, encouraging the adoption of NAPs 
as a means of implementation.4 Researchers and 
practitioners alike had, in the years prior, pointed 
out a lacuna in WPS implementation strategies. NAPs, 
then, became a means to ‘effectively translate this 
international framework into actionable changes 
at the national and local level’,5 and UNSCRs 
2122 and 1889 encouraged UN member states to 
develop NAPs for the implementation of WPS. 
NAPs represent the institutionalisation of UNSCR 
1325 by states.6 As of August 2019, 42% of states – or 
a total of 82 countries – had released NAPs.7 For 
policymakers and scholars of the WPS agenda, NAPs 
represent a concrete step by states to fulfil their 
objectives regarding UNSCR 1325 and the other 
resolutions that make up the WPS agenda.8 
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In this paper, we use both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis to answer the following research questions:
1. Which pillar(s) of the NAPs are dominant? 
Is this changing over time?
2. What are the dominant categories of lead, 
including over time and by region?
3. To what extent are new and/or emerging security 
issues – such as terrorism, climate change and 
reproductive rights – represented in the NAPs? 
4. To what extent is a budget specified in the NAPs?
5. To what extent do the NAPs contain provisions 
for monitoring and evaluation activities?
6. To what extent do the NAPs document the 
participation of civil society in production 
and implementation?
We conclude briefly with a discussion of the insights 
drawn from the analysis and some considerations and 
recommendations for future NAP development. In the 
following section, we briefly outline our dataset and 
the analytical approach that we took.
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The dataset
9   We have only included three of the pillars because we have not, at this stage, been able to find a straightforward way to code for the fourth pillar 
(humanitarian/relief and recovery) to accurately determine ‘skew’.
Our dataset consists of the 81 states that had 
produced (and made available) National Action 
Plans (NAPs) as of August 2019 (excluding from the 
count of 82 referenced above the Namibian NAP 
which was at that point unavailable for analysis) but 
including WPS-related policies produced by two 
states (Tajikistan and Bougainville). Some states 
have produced multiple NAPs. Therefore, our 
complete dataset is comprised of 128 documents 
(see Appendix 1).
Of these, we consider 81 to be ‘current’ NAPs: these 
are either the NAP that a state has produced (if it is 
their only NAP), or the most recent NAP that a state 
has produced, if they have released multiple NAPs 
(see Appendix 2).
Data collection and analysis
The dataset consists of the NAPs that were publicly 
available as of August 2019. Where a NAP was 
not available in English, we had the document 
professionally translated. This created an English-
language dataset of all available NAPs. Since then, 
new NAPs have been released – including by Namibia 
and Bangladesh – and we will continue to update the 
dataset as more NAPs become available.  
For each NAP, we noted several data points: country, 
region, year of publication, and the government agency 
or organisation that co-ordinated the development of, 
or took responsibility for, the Plan (such as the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of Defence). In the 
case of the first three data points (country, region and 
year of publication), this information was easily drawn 
from the National Action Plans. However, in the case 
of the department or organisation responsible for 
co-ordination, this occasionally required subjective 
assessment; for example, both of the Ugandan 
National Action Plans (published in 2008 and 2011) are 
attributed to the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social 
Development. We coded this under ‘Gender/Women’, 
though a convincing argument could be made for an 
alternative code, such as ‘Social Affairs’. 
We also explored which of the pillars each NAP ‘skews’ 
towards (where sufficient data is available). These ‘skews’ 
are based on the raw counts of the pillars of ‘prevention’, 
‘participation’ and ‘protection’ and are therefore 
designed to give a sense of the pillar upon which the NAP 
places the greatest emphasis.9 Because of the volume of 
data, we opted not to code each instance of ‘prevention’, 
‘participation’ and ‘protection’, instead conducting a raw 
count of the appearance of each pillar in the NAPs. While 
the benefit of this was that we were able to manage large 
amounts of data, the drawback is that these figures only 
give a general sense of the pillars, and don’t allow us to 
interrogate some of the potentially interesting overlaps 
in pillars, for example, or the different ways in which the 
pillars are used.
We then considered the prevalence of certain themes 
in the datasets (Appendix 3) and also went through 
each NAP individually, to investigate:
1. the level of budget specification
2. the extent to which monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) was specified, and
3. the level of civil society involvement in the 
production and implementation of the Plan. 
We scored these three elements according to six-point 
scales (as detailed in Appendices 4–6). There is a 
great deal of variation amongst NAPs, so even though 
we used these scales for the purposes of coding, an 
element of interpretive analysis was necessary when 
determining how extensively each NAP engaged with 
budgetary issues, monitoring and evaluation, and civil 
society input.
Our dataset and analytical approach
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10   Coomaraswamy, R., et al. (2015) Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1325, UN Women, 329.
11   Shepherd, L.J., and J. True (2014) ‘The Women, Peace and Security agenda and Australian leadership in the world: from rhetoric to commitment?’, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68(3): 257-284, 278-280.
12   Deiana, M.A. and K. McDonagh (2018) ‘“It is important, but…”: Translating the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda into the planning of EU peacekeeping 
missions’, Peacebuilding, 6(1): 34-48, 45-46.
13   Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 205; Basu, S. and C.C. Confortini (2016) ‘Weakest “p” in the 1325 pod? 
Realizing conflict prevention through Security Council resolution 1325’, International Studies Perspectives, 18(1): 43-63, 52; Basu, S. and L.J. Shepherd (2017) 
‘Prevention in pieces: representing conflict in the Women, Peace and Security agenda’, Global Affairs, 3(4-5): 441-453, 441-442.
14   See also ibid.
1. Which pillar(s) of the NAPs are dominant? Is this changing over time?
WPS NAPs tend to focus, in varying degrees, on 
the four pillars established under UNSCR 1325: 
prevention; participation; protection; and relief and 
recovery (humanitarian programming).10 The degree 
to which a NAP focuses on one pillar or another can be 
read as a reflection of the priorities of each state or 
institution and the views of actors involved in the 
development of the NAPs. 
However, there is often little stated about concrete 
actions or what is meant by each state when they 
reference these pillars.11 The participation pillar, for 
example, has been taken to mean both increasing the 
number of women in a peacekeeping-missions and  
facilitating meaningful participation in peace 
dialogues.12 The pillar of prevention poses similar 
difficulties. Prevention in the context of the WPS 
agenda can relate broadly to the prevention of conflict, 
though recent years have seen states increasingly use 
the concept in the narrower context of preventing 
conflict-related sexual violence (and then often in a 
narrow criminal justice context as opposed to a more 
holistic, primary prevention approach).13 As Figures 1 
and 2 demonstrate, until relatively recently, prevention 
was a somewhat neglected pillar of UNSCR 1325.14
Analysis 
Figure 1: Dominance of pillars in all NAPs over time (note that n = 127 here as Nepal had insufficient data)
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As Figure 1 shows, on a raw count, the participation 
pillar has proved the most influential over time, 
though there is growth on the prevention pillar, 
particularly in recent years. Because of the rawness 
of the data (as discussed above), though, this could 
represent an increased desire to prevent conflict 
in the first place, or – and possibly more likely given 
that the CRSV-related resolutions were adopted in 
2009 – it could relate to the prevention of CRSV. 
Protection has been an ongoing pillar across time, but 
recent times have seen fewer NAPs take protection 
as their dominant pillar, seemingly skewing instead 
towards participation. The notion of protection, as 
Björkdahl and Selimovic state, exposes the ‘unresolved 
tensions between “protection”, “representation”, 
and “participation” in UNSCR 1325 agenda’,15 and as a 
concept, ‘protection’ may not have the same appeal 
or potential as a transformative pillar of WPS  as do 
participation and prevention.16
Figure 2: Pillars over time (weighted, n=128)
15   Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, ‘Translating UNSCR 1325 from the global to the national’, 313; see also Hudson, H. (2017) ‘The power of mixed 
messages: Women, Peace, and Security language in National Action Plans from Africa’, Africa Spectrum, 52(3): 3-29.
16   de Preux, J. (1985) ‘Special protection of women and children’, International Review of the Red Cross, 248; Björkdahl and Selimovic, ‘Translating UNSCR 
1325 from the global to the national’, 328-329; Hudson, ‘The power of mixed messages’, 22-23.  
This trend can be seen even more clearly in Figure 2, 
where the prevention pillar ‘overtakes’ the protection 
pillar meaningfully for the first time in 2016 and has 
continued to appear with greater frequency than 
the protection pillar every year since. While it seems 
likely that participation will remain the most popular 
pillar in NAPs, we are interested to see if the upward 
trend in the prevention pillar will continue. We are 
also interested in more closely interrogating the 
contexts in which ‘prevention’ is – and has been – used 
conceptually, both within the NAPs and more broadly. 
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17   Swaine, A. (2009) ‘Assessing the potential of National Action Plans to advance implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325’, Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law, 12: 403-433, 417.
There is political significance of who is the lead actor 
named in a NAP. As Aisling Swaine argues, a NAP’s 
positioning within a government will determine its 
focus (domestic or foreign policy, for example) and its 
level of influence (national women’s machineries are 
typically lacking the resources and political status in 
many conflict-affected countries to strongly attract 
genuine political interest and funding).17
Figure 3: Category of lead over time (n=128)
As Figure 3 shows, states have largely seen the WPS 
agenda as a matter for Foreign Affairs or departments 
that have a focus on Gender or Women. Both of these 
placements may be problematic.
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The placement in Foreign Affairs can result in 
outward-facing NAPs, which see WPS as an agenda 
which addresses problems that occur ‘elsewhere’ – 
such as in the global South.18 This outward orientation 
positions WPS as a matter of foreign policy, aimed 
at (usually conflict-affected) areas outside of the 
territory of the authoring state. Consequently, these 
NAPs tend to conceive of WPS in narrow militarised 
terms, often focusing on the sufficient representation 
of women within the armed forces.19 These NAPs also 
tend to ignore the role(s) that the authoring states 
may play in fuelling conflict or insecurity beyond their 
own borders. 
The positioning of WPS in gender or women-focused 
agencies, on the other hand, reinforces a demarcation 
between women’s issues and peace and security.20 
18   Lee-Koo, K. and B.K. Trojanowska (2017) ‘Does the United Nations’ Women, Peace and Security agenda speak with, for or to women in the Asia Pacific? 
The development of National Action Plans in the Asia Pacific’, Critical Studies on Security, 5(3): 287-301, 296; Shepherd, L.J. (2016) ‘Making war safe for women?’ 
National Action Plans and the militarisation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda’, International Political Science Review, 37(3): 324-335, 325.
19   Shepherd, ‘Making war safe for women?, 325; Basu and Shepherd, ‘Prevention in Pieces’, 444-445.
20  Lee-Koo, K. (2014) ‘Implementing Australia’s National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 68(3): 300-313, 305-306.
21   Ibid., 311.
In doing so, it perpetuates the very framing that UNSCR 
1325 is aimed at dismantling. As Lee-Koo argues, ‘For 
a NAP to be successful it needs to be prioritised on 
the Government agenda across all portfolios’ – and 
not confined to one (frequently under-resourced and 
over-stretched) portfolio.21 
When we organise these data by region (Figure 4), the 
differences in category of lead are striking. National 
Action Plans coming out of countries in Africa and the 
Middle East, and to a large extent Oceania, account 
for the vast majority of Gender/Women NAP leads, 
whereas NAPs from Europe, North America and South 
America are overwhelmingly more likely to have 
Foreign Affairs as a lead agency or to take a whole-of-
government approach. 
Figure 4: Category of NAP lead by region (n=128)
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Recent years have seen a growth in this whole-of-
government approach, where no specific department 
is named as author or lead, or where there is a broad 
coalition between three or more departments. This 
is especially apparent in the current dataset of NAPs, 
in which there is an increase in whole-of-government 
responsibility for the implementation of the WPS 
agenda. While Foreign Affairs and Gender/Women 
continue to be the most prominent departments 
holding responsibility (with the regional split as 
described above remaining intact), governments have 
increasingly started to adopt a whole-of-government 
approach in the NAPs. 
The countries whose NAPs have (or have had) a whole-
of-government approach include Togo,22 Kyrgyzstan,23 
the Philippines,24 Albania,25 Belgium,26 Georgia,27 
Moldova,28 Norway,29 Ukraine,30 the United Kingdom,31 
the United States32 and Guatemala.33 The fourth 
Norwegian NAP explains the approach as follows:
No single body, section or embassy is 
expected to be able to deliver on all parts of 
the action plan. It is through joint efforts that 
we will achieve our ambitions and fulfil our 
commitments as they are described here.34
22   Togo (2011) ‘National Action Plan for the Involvement of Togolese Women in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: Implementation Strategies for 
Resolutions 1325 and 1820 of the Security Council of the United Nations’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).
23   Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2018) ‘Decree no. 334-p (r)’.
24   Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (2017) ‘National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022’.
25   Council of Ministers (2018) ‘Decision Nr. 524 dated 11.09.2019’.
26   Kingdom of Belgium (2017) ‘Third National Action Plan: “Women, Peace, Security” (2017-2021)’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI 
Shepherd).
27   Government of Georgia (2018) ‘2018-2020 National Action Plan of Georgia for Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security’.
28   Government of Moldova (2018) ‘Decision on the National Implementation Program of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security for 2018-2021 and the Action Plan regulation the Resolution 1325 Implementation’.
29   Norwegian Ministries (2019) ‘Women, Peace and Security (2019-2022)’.
30  Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine (2016) ‘National Action Plan on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution #1325: Women. Peace. Security’ till 2020’.
31   United Kingdom (2006) ‘UNSCR 1325 – United Kingdom High Level National Action Plan’; UK Government (2012) ‘UK Government National Action Plan on 
UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace & Security’; HM Government (2018) ‘UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security 2018-2022’.
32   The White House (2011) ‘United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security’; The White House (2016) ‘The United States National Action Plan 
on Women, Peace, and Security’.
33  Inter-Agency Roundtable on Women (2017) ‘National Action Plan for the Implementation of Resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council and 
Related Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security’.
34  Norwegian Ministries (2019) ‘Women, Peace and Security (2019-2022)’, 57
35   Ibid., 62
The document goes on to say:
The plan has been drawn up in a collaboration 
between all the ministries that are responsible 
for its implementation: the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security and the Ministry of 
Children and Equality. Norad has contributed 
input to the text and analyses, and other directors 
have also been included to a greater extent than 
before… Our goal is that the plan will be owned 
by the whole Norwegian system: foreign service 
missions and delegations, relevant ministries, 
directorates, academia and civil society.35
Given the (ever-increasing) breadth of issues 
encompassed by the WPS agenda (which we discuss 
in the following section), a whole-of-government 
approach is likely the most realistic way forward for 
the effective implementation of the WPS agenda. It 
recognises that the Agenda is a cross-cutting area that 
requires expertise from – and implementation by – all 
of the various elements of government.
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Figure 5: Lead agency in current NAPs (n=81)
Figure 6: Category of lead in current NAPs by region (n=81)
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As Figure 5 shows, it is very unusual for civil society to 
take the role of lead agency in the implementation of 
the NAP. In fact, the only National Action Plan in our 
dataset which saw civil society take such a prominent 
role is the Netherlands’ third National Action Plan, 
which was released in 2016 and covers the period 
of 2016-2019. 
This NAP, in which civil society takes a joint leadership 
role with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lays out 
‘a platform for cooperation between government 
and over 50 Dutch civil society organisations and 
knowledge institutions’ who collaborated in jointly 
drafting the plan.36 As the document explains:
WO-MEN, representing the civil society 
organisations and knowledge institutions, 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will 
continue to jointly coordinate all the activities 
in this third National Action Plan.37
36  1325/Dutch NAP Partnership (2016) ‘The Netherlands National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2016-2019’, 3.
37   Ibid., 4.
38   Ibid.
39   Ibid., 23.
It also, however, notes that, in the eyes of the Security 
Council at least, responsibility for implementation 
of the WPS agenda lies with the state, although ‘all 
the signatories share responsibility for this National 
Action Plan’.38 Later in the document, WO-MEN and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are described as the 
‘two coordinating partners’ of the Plan, with their 
cooperation framed as ‘a means to achieve our overall 
objective while respecting each other’s distinctive 
roles and mandates’.39  
We believe that civil society has an absolutely 
essential role to play in the development, drafting, 
implementation, monitoring and revision of NAPs, but 
needs to be supported by meaningful funding in order 
to carry out this role. This is something we return 
to shortly.
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3. To what extent are new and/or emerging security issues – such as terrorism, climate 
change and reproductive rights – represented in the NAPs? 
40  Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia  and Herzegovina Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiG  (2010) ‘Action  Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010-2013’; Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013) 
‘Action plan for implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2014-2017’; Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 
Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2017) ‘Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 “Women, Peace and Security”
in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2018-2022’.
41   Ministry of Women, Youth, Children & Family Affairs (2017) ‘Solomon Islands Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan 2017-2021’.
42   The Jordanian National Commission for Women (2017) ‘Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 
1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2021’.
43  S/RES/2467, para. 29.
NAPs often incorporate a range of issues that extend 
beyond traditional security concerns. Figure 7 tracks 
the frequency of mentions of nine such emergent 
security issues in the full dataset of NAPs. As this 
figure shows, far from being narrowly construed, the 
WPS agenda captures diverse issues and concerns. 
These are sometimes drawn from the Security Council 
resolutions, and sometimes reflect the context and 
interests of states and other implementing actors. 
Trafficking, for example, is prominent in the three 
NAPs produced by Bosnia and Herzegovina,40 while 
transitional justice is a recurring theme in the Solomon 
Islands’ NAP41 and terrorism is a primary focus in 
Jordan’s NAP.42
Some issues are quite well established; the needs of 
refugees, internally displaced persons, and persons 
seeking asylum, for example, have been part of the 
WPS agenda since UNSCR 1325 was adopted, and are 
mentioned in a number of the subsequent resolutions. 
This issue has also featured quite substantially and 
consistently in NAPs. 
In contrast, trafficking in persons has only recently 
been formally incorporated into the agenda, as a result 
of the adoption of UNSCR 2467, which encourages 
the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to 
consider information regarding Member States efforts 
to address the issue of trafficking in persons and its 
link with sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict 
situations committed by terrorist groups as part of 
their strategic objectives and ideology.43 Interestingly, 
however, concerns about trafficking were present in 
even the earliest NAPs, including the first iterations 
of those produced by Denmark (2005), Norway (2006) 
and Sweden (2006). In some cases, then, the NAPs are 
ahead of the curve.
Figure 7: New security issues over time (weighted, n=128)
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Beyond migration and trafficking, some of the other 
intersecting issues that have appeared in NAPs as 
part of the WPS agenda include terrorism, the arms 
trade, transitional justice issues, climate security, 
reproductive rights and the rights of LGBTQI people 
in conflict and conflict-affected settings. This makes 
the contemporary WPS agenda broad, something 
that more recent WPS resolutions have explicitly 
recognised; UNSCR 2242 (2015), for example, notes:
the changing global context of peace and 
security, in particular relating to rising violent 
extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, 
the increased numbers of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, the impacts of climate change 
and the global nature of health pandemics.44
The broadening of the agenda has, however, proved 
divisive. Russia and China have both expressed 
resistance to the idea of the agenda being widened.45 
This issue became especially prominent with the 
adoption of Resolution 2467 on 23 April 2019, the ninth 
resolution of the WPS agenda. Part of this resolution 
concerned the sexual and reproductive health and 
rights of victims of conflict-related sexual violence. 
As Feely et al. (2019) explain:
While there was pushback to the resolution 
from Russia and China (both of which abstained 
from voting on it), the US was adamant in 
its opposition to proposed language on 
emergency contraception, safe termination of 
pregnancy and HIV prevention and treatment, 
and later on previously agreed language 
relating to sexual and reproductive health that 
had been proposed as a compromise.46
44  S/RES/2242, preamble.
45  Basu, S. (2016) ‘The global South writes 1325 (too)’, International Political Science Review, 37(3): 362-374, 363-364.
46  Feely, G., L. Courtois, R. De Wilde and M. Walker (2019) ‘The month in women, peace and security: April 2019’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 
47   Goishabib, S. (2019) ‘What we think about the new Women, Peace and Security resolution’, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
48  Allen, L. and L.J. Shepherd (2019) ‘In pursuing a new resolution on sexual violence Security Council significantly undermines women’s reproductive rights’, 
LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security. 
As a result, the final version of the resolution made no 
reference to sexual and reproductive health,47 thus 
setting ‘a dangerous precent for the agenda’.48 
There are also things that are conspicuous in their 
absence, both in the formal agenda and in the NAPs. 
There are intersections of violence that do not 
start or end with situations of armed conflict. By 
defining peace and security as the absence of armed 
conflict, the WPS agenda overlooks the ways in which 
security is tied to identity in a given a populace. 
This point is particularly relevant in relation to 
First Nations women’s experiences in various polities, 
including Australia, and is commonly encountered 
in outward-facing NAPs, which can fail to recognise 
WPS-related issues that arise in the domestic context, 
for example, or which result from circumstances that 
do not constitute ‘armed conflict’ but are nonetheless 
characterised by widespread criminal violence 
that may be experienced disproportionately by 
certain groups.
In order to remain a relevant and responsible agenda, 
it is vital that WPS actors continue to recognise the 
different ways in which women’s diverse security needs 
intersect with various other issues. By necessity, this 
will involve the broadening of the agenda, as new 
security issues and contexts emerge. At the same 
time, however, with three veto-holding states who 
have indicated a reluctance to broaden the agenda, 
there may be the need to pursue advances in the WPS 
agenda strategically. We must also be mindful that any 
thematic expansions of the WPS agenda places greater 
pressure on civil society working in this space, who 
must cover more ground with few resources.
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4. To what extent is a budget specified in the NAPs? 
49   Coomaraswamy et al. Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 246; Goldberg, D., A. Fal, E. Kamler, S. Khan, R. Stanger, E.V. 
Chowdhury, and K. Yzique (2015) ‘Global report: Civil society organization (CSO) survey for the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security CSO Perspectives on 
UNSCR 1325 implementation 15 years after adoption’, 62.
50  Coomaraswamy et al. Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 246-247; Cordaid and GNWP (2014) Financing for the Implementation 
of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325: Critical for Advancing Women’s Human Rights, Peace and Security, 12-13.
The lack of sustainable funding is a major obstacle to 
the implementation of the WPS agenda.49  For a NAP 
to be effective, it requires a specific budget allocation 
for WPS activities, a ‘predictable and sustainable 
financing’ source, and proper management and 
tracking of funds.50 As it stands, however, a large 
percentage of NAPs fail to allocate a specific budget 
for WPS activities.
As Figures 8 shows, most budgets either have no or 
very little specification of how the NAP-producing 
country intends to fund their NAP activities 
(see Appendix 4 for details on the six-point 
coding framework).
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Figure 8: Level of budget specification in all NAPs, 0-5 (n=128)
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Though we note an upward trend in Figure 9, the 
average level of budget specification remains under 1.5 
out of a possible score of 5 (as per Figure 8 above). This 
is, in short, very disappointing. The lack of sustainable 
funding has consistently been cited as a barrier to the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. Despite the evidence 
that supports the need for an increase in funding, 
states continue to perform poorly to the detriment of 
the agenda.51 
Often, NAPs note that a budget is needed to undertake 
the WPS activities outlined, but there is no real 
specification of how much funding would be needed 
or from where this funding would come (see, for 
51   Coomaraswamy et al. Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 368-391; Skjelsbæk, I., and T.L. Tryggestad (2019) ‘Donor states delivering 
on WPS: The case of Norway’, in S.E. Davies and J. True (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 515-527, 521.
52   El Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (2015) ‘National Action Plan of the Argentine Republic of the implementation of resolution no. 1325 (2000) of the United Nations 
Security Council et seq.’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).
53   The White House (2011) ‘United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security’.
54   Kingdom of Belgium (2017) ‘Third National Action Plan: “Women, Peace, Security” (2017-2021)’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).
55   Gobierno de España (2017) ‘Second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security’.
56   Coordinating Minister of People’s Welfare of the Republic of Indonesia (2014) ‘The National Action Plans for the protection and empowerment of women 
and children during social conflicts of 2014-2019’.
57   Council of Ministers (2018) ‘On approving the Action Plan on implementation of the resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council on Women, 
Peace and Security, 2018-2020’.
58   Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Ministry of Human Rights and Civic Promotion (2012) ‘National Action Plan of Burkina Faso for the implementation 
of resolution 1325 and 1820 of the Security Council of the United Nations’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).
59   Republic of the Gambia (2012) ‘The Gambia National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325’.
60  The Jordanian National Commission for Women (2017) ‘Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 
1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2021’.
61   Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine (2016) ‘National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution #1325 “Women. Peace. Security” till 2020.’.
example, the NAPs of Argentina,52 the United States,53 
and Belgium54). Some NAPs specify that the additional 
activities are to be absorbed into government 
departments’ existing budgets (such as the NAPs of 
Spain55 and Indonesia56). In contrast, the NAPs that stood 
out in this analysis were those in which the budget was 
well defined, recognising that each section – or even 
each activity – has specific funding needs, which are 
enumerated (see, for example, the NAPs of Albania,57 
Burkina Faso,58 The Gambia,59 Jordan,60 and Ukraine61). 
The current set of NAPS does not give us any reason 
for hope, as shown in Figures 10 and 11.
Figure 9: Average level of budget specification in all NAPs over time
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 Figure 10: Level of budget specification in current NAPs, 0-5 (n=81)
Figure 11: Average level of budget specification in current NAPs (n=81)
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Here, the downward trend is clear, and particularly 
apparent in the NAPs adopted since 2014. There 
is a group of countries that display this downward 
trend starkly: those which have had more detailed 
specification of budget in an earlier NAP than in a 
subsequent NAP. For example, the United Kingdom’s 
third NAP62 identified the specific pools of money that 
would fund the NAP activities (though it did not break 
activities down into specific financial allocations), while 
its fourth NAP63 indicates that the current position is 
for ‘UK Government departments [to] fund work from 
their core budgets’.64
Rwanda and the DRC are interesting cases with regard 
to their budgets. In Rwanda’s first NAP – published in 
201065 – the state was especially strong in its level of 
budget specification (and, incidentally, in the level of 
civil society involvement in planning and in specifying 
the monitoring and evaluation processes). In that NAP, 
each activity line had a specific corresponding amount. 
In Rwanda’s second NAP,66 however, there is no longer 
a budget specified in any detail at all. Similarly, the 
DRC’s 2013 NAP67 had a very detailed level of budget 
specification, containing a line-by-line breakdown 
of the cost of implementing the NAP; the 2019-2022 
NAP, by contrast, refers vaguely to a trust fund that 
has been set up to support the state’s WPS activities, 
with no specific budgets allocated to implementing 
the plan.68 
62   Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014) ‘United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security’.
63  HM Government (2018) ‘UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security 2018-2022’.
64  Ibid., 24; though we note that this includes the Foreign Commonwealth Office’s Global Britain Fund and ‘cross-government funds including CSSF [Conflict, 
Stability and Security Fund]’, 24.
65   Republic of Rwanda (2010) ‘National Action Plan 2009-2012’.
66  Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2018) ‘Rwanda National Action Plan (2018-2022) for the implementation of United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions’.
67   Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Gender, Family and Children (2013) ‘Action Plan of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325’.
68   The Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Gender, Family and Children (2018) ‘National Action Plan for implementing United Nations Security 
Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, 2nd generation’.
69   Policy Department DSI/SB (2007) ‘Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325: Taking a stand for women, peace and security’.
70   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (2011) ‘Women: Powerful agents for peace and security: Dutch National Action Plan 2012-2015’.
71   1325/Dutch NAP Partnership (2016) ‘The Netherlands National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2016-2019’.
72   Ibid.
73   Shepherd and True, ‘The Women, Peace and Security agenda and Australian leadership in the world’, 268; Coomaraswamy et al., Preventing Conflict, 
Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 247.  
74   Shepherd and True, ‘The Women, Peace and Security agenda and Australian leadership in the world’, 265-267; Coomaraswamy et al., Preventing Conflict, 
Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace; Goldberg et al., Global Report; Hudson, ‘The power of mixed messages’.
Similarly, the Netherlands’ first NAP69 recognised that 
funding was needed to carry out the WPS activities 
that were outlined in the NAP without specifying from 
where this budget was to come. The Netherlands’ 
second NAP,70 in contrast, identifies the funding 
commitments – or time in lieu – of the ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and Defence, of the Clingendael 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations and 
of various civil society groups. In doing so, the NAP 
acknowledges that WPS work requires funding and 
labour, and quantifies this. However, in the third 
Dutch National Action Plan, which was published in 
2016,71 the budget specification is again vague, stating 
that ‘[t]he Ministry of Foreign Affairs will allocate an 
annual budget for the implementation of this National 
Action Plan’.72
This trend does not bode well for the meaningful 
implementation of the agenda in the years to come. 
There certainly seems to be a rise in rhetorical 
commitments by states. Questions remain, however, 
about whether these commitments can be considered 
a positive step in the face of a continued lack of 
meaningful funding. This divide between rhetoric 
and action is particularly notable when we consider 
the continued lack of or consistent underfunding of 
WPS activities by states.73 This issue of NAPs which 
lack earmarked budgets for WPS is not new, as 
noted by numerous scholars and practitioners;74 its 
persistence demonstrates, in part, that states do not 
yet prioritise WPS as part of their broader peace and 
security agendas. 
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5. To what extent do the NAPs contain provisions for monitoring and 
evaluation activities?
75   African Union (2019) ‘Continental results framework for reporting and monitoring on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in 
Africa (2018-2028)’. 
76   Desmidt, S., and L. Davis (2019) Rhetoric and Real Progress on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa; Global Network of Women Peace Builders 
(2013) Implementing Locally, Inspiring Globally: Localizing UNSCR 1325 in Colombia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, 55, 82-83; Goldstein et al., 
Global Report’, 30.
In addition to sufficient and reliable funding, effective 
NAPs need robust and clearly defined monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) frameworks. Monitoring and 
evaluation frameworks allow states and stakeholders 
to be clear about goals, timeframes, resources and 
indicators; they create consensus on how to evaluate 
the progress, impact, and implementation of a given 
WPS initiative in a state or region; and they reduce 
policy incoherence and duplication.75 The absence 
of systemic approaches to M&E frameworks in NAP 
development, on the other hand, represents an 
obstacle to meaningful action on WPS.76 
On the whole, we found that the M&E specification 
across all NAPs was generally reasonable; we 
rated the majority of NAPs as a 3 or above on this 
indicator (Figure 12; see Appendix 5 for details of the 
6-point coding scale). This has also seen a marked 
improvement over time (Figure 13). 
Figure 12: Level of M&E specification in all NAPs, 0-5 (n=128)
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The current NAPs are no different (Figures 14 and 15); 
again, while there is room for improvement, most 
states tended to be able to articulate their anticipated 
NAP-related activities with a reasonable degree of 
specificity, with the average level of M&E specification 
being a little over 3 (in which we considered that an 
M&E framework is generally defined – such as activities 
being broadly identified, timeframes being the duration 
of the NAP and parties somewhat identified).
States have found different ways to represent their 
WPS commitments through their NAPs, but we found 
those which were most effective in this respect 
extensively defined their M&E framework, including 
a clear and comprehensive specification of the 
activities that they would undertake along with specific 
measurable outcomes, timeframes and responsible 
parties stipulated.
Figure 14: Level of M&E specification in current NAPs, 0-5 (n=81)Pa
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Figure 13: Average level of M&E specification in all NAPs, 0-5 (n=128)
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Burundi’s NAP contains an example of a strong M&E 
framework.77 Broad objectives are broken into the 
expected result, the relevant activities that would 
make up that result, the responsible ministry and 
any additional partners, and indicators. Each of the 
activities has a timeframe to the nearest quarter, 
meaning that, for example, the activity of creating 
‘a pool of educators for gender and transformative 
leadership, conflict management and political 
participation’ was expected to take place in the 
second quarter of 2012. However, we would have liked 
to see more specificity in the outcomes – so instead 
of the indicator being ‘[n]umber of training sessions 
organised’, for example, a stronger framework would 
replace this with, say, ‘4 training sessions organised’. 
 
This is something that Ukraine did well in its 2016 
NAP;78 its indicators were broken down into yearly 
targets meaning that, under the task of ‘preventing and 
combating violence against women’, for example, the 
NAP anticipated the development of one legislative 
act annually from 2016-2020, 4 developed materials 
(one each for 2017-2020) and a total of 268 conducted 
campaigns (53 in 2016; 54 in 2017; 52 in 2018; 53 in 2019; 
and 56 in 2020).
77   Republic of Burundi Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender (2011) ‘National Action Plan 2012-2016 Action Plan for the implementation of 
resolution 1325 (2000) of the Security Council of the United Nations’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).
78   Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine (2016) ‘National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution #1325 “Women. Peace. Security” till 
2020’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).
There are, however, also challenges associated with 
setting out a multi-year project with this level of 
specificity. It may be the case that, for example, a plan 
that made sense at the outset of the NAP no longer 
meets the on-the-ground needs four years later, 
in what might be a dramatically different context. 
An ongoing question then, is how to balance the 
need for sufficient specificity to allow for effective 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation while 
retaining enough flexibility to ensure that the 
WPS activities undertaken are still appropriate 
and effective.
Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms needs 
commitment from all stakeholders and meaningful, 
realistic funding to support these activities. There also 
needs to be a party who ultimately holds responsibility 
for actually carrying out and overseeing the monitoring 
and evaluation process and for the ‘next steps’ to be 
clearly established should indicators fail to be met. Civil 
society actors may prove to be valuable partners in 
independently monitoring a state’s implementation of 
the NAP (and, indeed, many civil society organisations 
around the world have independently taken on this task), 
but this is an activity that should be funded, and findings 
and feedback incorporated in any future iterations.
Figure 15: Average level of M&E specification in current NAPs
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6. To what extent do the NAPs document the participation of civil society in production 
and implementation?
79   Jacevic, M.M. (2018) ‘WPS, states, and the National Action Plans’, in S.E. Davies and J. True (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and 
Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 274-289, 279.
80  Fritz, J. M. (2018) ‘Creating or Improving a National Action Plan based on UN Security Council resolution 1325’, in S. Shekhawat (ed.), Gender, Conflict, Peace, 
and UNSC Resolution 1325, Lanham, United States: Lexington Books, 83-98; Jacevic, ‘WPS, states, and the National Action Plans’; Mundkur, A. and L.J. Shepherd 
(2018) ‘Civil Society Participation in Women, Peace and Security Governance: Insights from Australia’, Security Challenges, 14(2): 83-103.
81   Jacevic, ‘WPS, states, and the National Action Plans’, 279-280.
82   Aharoni, S.B. (2014) ‘Internal variation in norm localization: Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325 in Israel’, Social Politics: International Studies in 
Gender, State and Society, 21(1): 1-25; Global Network of Women Peace Builders (2013) Implementing Locally, Inspiring Globally’.
83   Global Network of Women Peace Builders (2013) Implementing Locally, Inspiring Globally’, 5.
84  Coomaraswamy et al., Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 15, 168, 243, 250.
Coordination, including with civil society organisations 
(CSOs), is an important aspect of an effective NAP. 
Ideally, CSOs are seen ‘as an equal partner to its 
governmental counterparts in all stages’.79 One benefit 
of including CSOs in a meaningful way in the process 
of NAP development and implementation is that it 
can promote inclusion.80 The inclusion of women and 
girls in decision-making around peace and security is a 
central ethos of UNSCR 1325. Given that participation 
is a central pillar of WPS, it is vital for inclusivity 
to be built into the development of NAPs and the 
implementation of the WPS agenda. This means 
not only consulting civil society in developing and 
implementing NAPs but consulting widely with civil 
society (such as in rural or regional areas as well as in 
cities) to ensure that challenges to peace and security 
experienced by specific populations are recognised 
and incorporated.
High impact NAPs have an ‘inclusive design process’ 
where various government agencies, CSOs and vested 
actors are ideally ‘represented in both the creation 
and implementation of the plan’.81 The inclusive design 
process, however, is often frustrated by a lack of clarity 
around the role of CSOs in the WPS development 
and implementation process, and an absence 
of adequate coordination mechanisms to mediate the 
relationship between government and CSOs.
The inclusion of voices from civil society has another 
important benefit: that of localisation, which 
focuses on contextualisation of NAPs to specific 
states’ socio-political environments. Localisation with 
regards to WPS refers to initiatives that are aimed 
at reinterpreting and reconstructing UNSCR 
1325, an international norm, to specific sub-national 
contexts.82 Localisation focuses on ownership of 
WPS by encouraging the inclusion of local voices 
and knowledge to further the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325.83 A NAP that focuses on local knowledge, 
contexts, and needs is more likely to be responsive 
and effective as opposed to wholesale policy 
transfers from the international context or emulation 
of other states’ NAPs.84  
 As Figures 16 and 17 demonstrate, there is some 
degree of engagement with civil society in the 
development of the NAPs, but there is scope for more 
clearly defined and substantive input. Very few NAPs, 
for example, name civil society as a co-drafter along 
with the state (with the Netherlands’ third National 
Action Plan – noted above – being one exception). 
Most NAPs, however, either have very limited or no 
clear engagement with civil society at all (see Appendix 
6 for the coding framework that we used).
However, there is evidence that the level of 
engagement with civil society is increasing, which is a 
promising sign. As Figure 17 shows, the average level of 
engagement has doubled over the timeframe studied.
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Figure 17: Average level of documented engagement with civil society in NAPs over time (n=128)
Figure 16: Level of documented engagement with civil society in all NAPs, 0-5 (n=128)
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However, the current NAPs paint a less positive picture. 
Most current NAPs mention civil society in passing, by 
way of a thank you on an acknowledgements page, for 
example, but provide no real specification of activity 
or extent of involvement. When acknowledgements 
are given, engagement with civil society tends to be 
framed very vaguely: many NAPs noted ‘consultations 
with’ or ‘feedback provided by’ civil society actors, 
without indicating whether or not the expertise of civil 
society was actually incorporated into the final version 
of the report. 
While the positive trend continues in the current 
dataset (Figure 19), it is much less pronounced 
than in the full dataset (Figure 17), suggesting that 
the substantive inclusion of civil society in the 
development of NAPs is slowing down. However, we 
are hopeful that the high average level of engagement 
demonstrated in 2019 is not an outlier in recent years, 
and that CSO engagement continues to rise in the 
coming years. 
Two NAPs that demonstrate a strong commitment 
to engaging with civil society in a meaningful way are 
those of Timor Leste and Togo. The development 
of the NAP in Timor Leste involved extensive 
collaboration between civil society and the 
government throughout the NAP process, from early 
awareness-raising and advocacy activities and learning 
exercises to high-level and national consultations, 
and the report was drafted jointly by members of a 
Drafting Team made up of government and civil society 
members.85 While the government takes responsibility 
for implementing the NAP, the NAP indicates that civil 
society will play a role in ‘support[ing] implementation 
and monitoring of NAP on UNSCR 1325 activities, 
85   Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2016) ‘National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, 
Peace and  Security  (2016-2020)’, 6.
86   Ibid., 8.
87   Togo (2011) ‘National Action Plan for the involvement of Togolese women in conflict resolution and  peacebuilding: Implementation strategies for resolutions 
1325 and 1820 of the Security Council of the United Nations’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).
88   Ibid., 2
89   Australian Government (2012) ‘Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018’. 
90  An Roinn Gnóthai ́ Eachtracha Agus Trádála (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade)(2011) ‘Ireland’s National Action Plan for implementation of UNSCR 
1325, 2011-2014’; Rialtas Na Héireann (Government of Ireland) (2015) ‘Ireland’s Second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2015-2018)’.
91   ‘The  Philippine National Action Plan on UNSCRs  1325 & 1820: 2010-2016’; Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (2017) ‘National Action Plan 
on Women, Peace and Security’.
92   ‘Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution  1325’; 1325/Dutch NAP Partnership (2016) ‘The Netherlands  National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 
2016-2019’.
93   Republic of Cameroon (2017) ‘National Action Plan for the 1325 resolution and companion resolutions of the United Nations Security Council on Women, 
Peace and Security’.
advocat[ing] resource allocation and implementation 
of the plan, and develop[ing] shadow reporting on 
progress achieved’.86 Timor Leste’s level of monitoring 
and evaluation specification is also positive. However, 
it has very little by way of budget specification; while 
we applaud  the extensive consideration and inclusion 
of civil society in this NAP, it goes without saying that 
the time, involvement and expertise of members of 
civil society need to be fairly remunerated, and that 
civil society needs to be properly funded in order to be 
able to continue its work. 
This is also the case in Togo, in which the government, 
civil society, national trade unions and the United 
Nations collaborated to draft the NAP.87 Civil society 
is seen as having a central role in the development 
and implementation of Togo’s WPS-related activities, 
conducting various ‘awareness-raising, informational 
and training activities’ including advocacy campaigns, 
marches, debates, and a Caravan for Peace.88 Again, 
however, the NAP is conspicuously silent on who 
is going to pay for the time, effort and expertise 
of civil society. We can see the same pattern in 
the NAPs of Australia,89 Ireland,90 Philippines,91 and 
the Netherlands.92
Cameroon and Burundi are exceptions here. 
Cameroon’s NAP evinces both a commitment to 
work meaningfully with civil society and to recognise 
that courses and workshops, advocacy campaigns, 
gender-sensitive support programmes, and the 
building and maintenance of strategic alliances require 
funding – and they do so with a concrete amount 
for every single activity.93 Indeed, the Cameroonian 
and Burundian NAPs come closest to representing 
‘best practice’ insofar as the reporting of civil society 
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Figure 18: Level of documented engagement with civil society in current NAPs, 0-5 (n=81)
Figure 19: Average level of documented engagement with civil society in current NAPs (n=81)
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engagement, budget specification and monitoring 
and evaluation indicators are concerned. Burundi’s 
NAP is similarly detailed across all three of civil 
society, funding and M&E.94 However, the NAPs of 
both Cameroon and Burundi note that funding is 
contingent on the finding of external partners – in 
the case of Cameroon, a workshop was held in 2011 
in order to ‘identify available and potential sources 
of funding’ for the implementation of the NAP,95 while 
Burundi’s NAP refers to the identification of possible 
‘financial technical partners’.96 Thus, while both 
NAPs are commendable for their recognition of the 
need to fund civil society activity in relation to WPS, 
these commitments may not eventuate into actual 
resources for the civil society organisations engaging in 
WPS work.
For the reasons we note above, it is vital for 
governments to engage with civil society when 
developing WPS NAPs. As we have identified, there are 
countries which have developed a strong relationship 
with civil society in this space. However, the 
overwhelming majority of NAP-producing countries 
have not acknowledged the inconvenient fact that civil 
society cannot operate without funding. Civil society 
cannot sustainably provide free advice, free advocacy, 
free shadow reports, free feedback, free consultation 
services or free support to people on the ground. Nor, 
indeed, should it be expected to. If states actually 
value civil society’s input – as many NAPs proclaim – 
they need to fund civil society actors.
94   Republic of Burundi (2011) ‘Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000) of the Security Council of the United Nations’, unofficial translation, 
funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).
95   Republic of Cameroon (2017) ‘National Action Plan for the 1325 resolution and companion resolutions of the United Nations Security Council on Women, 
Peace and Security’, 8.
96   Republic of Burundi (2011) ‘Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000) of the Security Council of the United Nations, unofficial translation, 
funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd), 68.P
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There are different views on what makes a WPS 
NAP an effective policy framework; however, there 
are some consistent themes that emerge throughout 
the literature. These include the importance of 
funding, political will and coordination; inclusion 
and localisation; and systemic monitoring and 
evaluation frameworks. An effective NAP identifies 
policy priorities and outlines concrete steps, such as 
funding and resource allocation, toward addressing 
them. Furthermore, it contains a clear strategy 
for collaboration with local or regional CSOs and 
interest groups; and establishes indicators for 
measuring and evaluating progress, including time 
frames. A good NAP represents a strategic roadmap or 
tool to further the implementation of the state’s WPS 
policy and should hold actors accountable to their 
commitments.97  The NAP itself is not a replacement or 
proxy for substantive policy goals and implementation 
initiatives;98 it is a planning and strategic tool, not 
an end in and of itself. A NAP is ‘a blueprint that 
governments, multilateral institutions, and civil society 
can use to coordinate action and track results’.99 
 
97   Miller, Pournik and Swaine, ‘Women in peace and security’, 53.
98   Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014) ‘OSCE study on National Action Plans on the implementation of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325’, 27.
99  Hood, M. (2016) ‘What are National Action Plans and why do they matter?’.
100 Castillo-Diaz, P. and H. Cueva-Beteta (2018) ‘The promise and limits of indicators on Women, Peace and Security’, in F.Ní Aoláin, N. Cahn, D.F. Haynes, and 
N. Valji (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185-196; Hudson, N.F. (2018) ‘The challenges of monitoring and 
analyzing WPS for scholars’, in S.E. Davies and J. True (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
101 Chowdhury Fink, N., and A. Davidian (2018) ‘Complementarity and convergence?: Women, Peace and Security and counterterrorism’, in F. Ní Aoláin, N. Cahn, 
D.F. Haynes, and N. Valji (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 157-168.
102 In particular, the process of NAP development has not typically been systematically documented by states and stakeholders; see Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 
‘Women in peace and security’, 18. As such, the literature tends to focus on a handful of recurrent case studies that exhibit best practice and are exemplars of 
‘success’; Abdela, L. (2011) ‘Nepal and the implementation of UNSCR 1325’, in F. Olonisakin, K. Barnes, and E. Ikpe (Eds), Women, Peace and Security: Translating 
Policy into Practice, London: Routledge, 66-87, 73-77; Skjelsbæk  and Tryggestad, ‘Donor states delivering on WPS’, 519-522. However, given that the early wave 
of WPS NAPs emerged out of Europe, the literature on best-practice is heavily skewed by assumptions that are steeped in European beliefs about security, race, 
and women’s agency; Basu, ‘The global South writes 1325 (too)’, Lee-Koo and Trojanowska, ‘Does the United Nations’ Women, Peace and Security agenda speak 
with, for or to women in the Asia Pacific?’, 291; Pratt, N. (2013) ‘Reconceptualizing gender, reinscribing racial–sexual boundaries in international security: The 
case of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security”’, International Studies Quarterly, 57(4): 772-783. The view that WPS is a product of 
the global North reinforces ‘a world in which problems occur “elsewhere”, but solutions can be found “here”’; Shepherd, ‘Making ‘War Safe for Women?’, 325. 
Consequently, whole regions, like the Asia-Pacific, remain under-researched in the WPS literature; Lee-Koo and Trojanowska, Does the United Nations’ Women, 
Peace and Security agenda speak with, for or to women in the Asia Pacific?’, 291-292.
The renewed emphasis on indicators of efficacy in 
WPS is open to manipulation to produce 
‘predetermined results’; and has the potential to 
undermine meaningful action.100 An ‘ideal’ NAP (based 
on the 6-point scale that we have used in this report), 
containing a clear and earmarked budget, detailed, 
timebound and specific M&E expectations and with 
a CSO co-drafter is nonetheless irrelevant if it is not 
actually implemented. We also recognise that an undue 
focus on concrete and measurable outcomes may 
come at the expense of more flexible and ambitious 
impact-focused indicators.  
Indeed, a focus on ‘effectiveness indicators’ is usually 
concerned with quantified data, and overlooks 
the multiplicity of ways in which the WPS agenda 
is incorporated and transformed in the process of 
NAP development, the convergence of different 
policy frameworks (such as defence, anti-terrorism 
and foreign policy), and the political and institutional 
factors that may impede or facilitate meaningful 
action.101 While the findings that we present above 
give some insight into contemporary NAPs, this is 
clearly not the only story that could be told about NAP 
formation and implementation. A fuller understanding 
of these documents would require a complementary 
qualitative enquiry.102 
 
Conclusions, considerations, 
and recommendations
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A precursor to an effective WPS NAP, as in any 
policy area, is political will. ‘Political will, in which 
leaders prioritize the central inclusion and security 
of women and girls, is very important in change 
initiatives’.103 Similarly, Jacevic explains political 
will as meaning ‘that critical government ministries 
and agencies recognize the value of their NAP, 
are committed to its progress, and take action to 
implement it’.104 Political will extends to all levels 
of governments but it requires a concerted top-
down approach to be effective. The development 
of NAPs in socio-political conditions that are 
actively averse to the advancement of women and 
their inclusion in the political process lends itself to 
implementation failures. 
NAPs have a great deal of potential. Eighty-two states 
and counting have had someone – usually many 
someones – sit down and reflect on what the WPS 
agenda means in the context of their country. NAPs 
require consideration – and no doubt negotiation 
– of priorities, responsibilities, funding, and the 
ideas of gender, peace, and security. NAPs (perhaps 
inadvertently) reveal a lot about countries: which 
relationships they see as valuable, how they see their 
place in the world, and what the most pressing security 
issues are perceived to be. 
But NAPs shouldn’t just be documents. The whole 
point of a NAP is that it is to be implemented: so that 
more women will take part in peace negotiations; so 
that gender-based violence is reduced, or eliminated, 
in conflict and post-conflict contexts; so that 
necessary services are funded on the ground; and, 
of course, so that, ultimately, conflict is prevented. 
As we approach the anniversary of the first twenty 
years of the WPS agenda, this, then, must be the goal: 
now is the time for states to move from rhetoric to 
commitment, and from plan to implementation.
 
103 Fritz, ‘Creating or Improving a National Action Plan’, 87.
104 Jacevic, ‘WPS, states, and the National Action Plans’, 283.P
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# NAPs  
in country
 
Country
 
Year
1 Afghanistan 2015
1 Albania 2018
1 Angola 2017
1 Argentina 2015
1 Armenia 2019
1 Australia 2012
2 Austria 2007 2012
3 Belgium 2008 2013 2017
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 2014 2018
1 Bougainville 2016
1 Brazil 2017
1 Burkina Faso 2012
1 Burundi 2012
1 Cameroon 2018
2 Canada 2010 2017
1 CAR 2012
2 Chile 2009 2015
1 Cote D’Ivoire 2008
1 Croatia 2011
1 Czech Republic 2017
3 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2010 2013 2018
3 Denmark 2005 2008 2014
1 El Salvador 2017
2 Estonia 2010 2015
3 Finland 2008 2012 2018
2 France 2010 2015
1 Gambia 2012
3 Georgia 2012 2016 2018
2 Germany 2013 2017
1 Ghana 2012
1 Guatemala 2017
1 Guinea 2009
1 Guinea-Bissau 2010
3 Iceland 2008 2013 2018
1 Indonesia 2014
1 Iraq 2014
3 Ireland 2011 2015 2019
3 Italy 2010 2014 2016
1 Japan 2015
1 Jordan 2018
1 Kenya 2016
Appendices
Appendix 1: The complete dataset (n=128)
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# NAPs  
in country
 
Country
 
Year
1 Kosovo 2013
2 Kyrgyzstan 2013 2018
1 Liberia 2009
1 Lithuania 2011
1 Luxembourg 2018
1 Macedonia 2013
1 Mali 2012
1 Moldova 2018
1 Montenegro 2017
1 Mozambique 2018
1 Nepal 2011
1 New Zealand 2015
1 Niger 2016
2 Nigeria 2013 2017
4 Norway 2006 2011 2015 2019
2 Palestine 2015 2017
1 Paraguay 2015
2 Philippines 2010 2017
1 Poland 2018
2 Portugal 2009 2014
1 Republic of Korea 2014
1 Romania 2014
2 Rwanda 2009 2018
1 Senegal 2011
2 Serbia 2010 2017
1 Sierra Leone 2010
2 Slovenia 2010 2018
1 Solomon Islands 2017
1 South Sudan 2015
2 Spain 2007 2017
3 Sweden 2006 2009 2016
4 Switzerland 2007 2010 2013 2018
1 Tajikistan 2014
3 The Netherlands 2008 2012 2016
1 Timor Leste 2016
1 Togo 2011
1 Uganda 2008
1 Ukraine 2016
4 United Kingdom 2006 2010 2014 2018
2 United States of America 2011 2016
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Country Year of publication
Afghanistan 2015
Albania 2018
Angola 2017
Argentina 2015
Armenia 2019
Australia 2012
Austria 2012
Belgium 2017
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2017
Bougainville 2016
Brazil 2017
Burkina Faso 2012
Burundi 2011
Cameroon 2017
Canada 2017
Central African Republic 2014
Chile 2015
Cote d’Ivoire 2008
Croatia 2011
Czech Republic 2017
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2018
Denmark 2014
El Salvador 2017
Estonia 2015
Finland 2018
France 2015
Gambia 2012
Georgia 2018
Germany 2017
Ghana 2012
Guatemala 2017
Guinea 2009
Guinea-Bissau 2010
Iceland 2018
Indonesia 2014
Iraq 2014
Ireland 2019
Italy 2016
Japan 2015
Jordan 2017
Kenya 2016
Country Year of publication
Kosovo 2014
Kyrgyzstan 2018
Liberia 2009
Lithuania 2011
Luxembourg 2018
Macedonia 2012
Mali 2012
Moldova 2018
Montenegro 2017
Mozambique 2018
Nepal 2011
New Zealand 2015
Niger 2016
Nigeria 2017
Norway 2019
Palestine 2017
Paraguay 2015
Philippines 2017
Poland 2018
Portugal 2014
Republic of Korea 2014
Romania 2014
Rwanda 2018
Senegal 2011
Serbia 2017
Sierra Leone 2010
Slovenia 2018
Solomon Islands 2017
South Sudan 2015
Spain 2017
Sweden 2016
Switzerland 2018
Tajikistan 2014
The Netherlands 2016
Timor-Leste 2016
Togo 2011
Uganda 2008
Ukraine 2016
United Kingdom 2018
United States of America 2016
Appendix 2: Dataset of ‘current’ NAPs (n = 81)
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Issue Actual search term in NVivo
refugee/IDP asylum OR refugee OR displaced
disasters disasters
LGBTQI+ LBQ OR LGBT OR LGBTQ OR LGBTQI OR LGBTQIA OR gay OR lesbian OR queer OR homosexual
sexual and reproductive health reproductive
human trafficking traffick 
climate change environment OR climate OR environmental
civil society “civil society” 
transitional justice mechanisms “transitional justice” OR reconciliation OR reparations
sexual violence “sexual violence” OR rape OR “sexual and gender-based violence” OR “sexual and other 
violence” OR “gender-based violence” OR “gender-based persecution” 
small arms and light weapons “arms trade” OR “small arms” OR “light weapons” 
terrorism/extremism terrorism OR terror OR terrorist OR extremism OR extremist OR radical OR radicalized OR 
radicalised OR radicalisation OR radicalization
prevention prevention
participation participation
protection protection
Appendix 3: NVivo searches for new and/or 
emerging security issues and for pillars
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Budget
0 No mention of budget
1 Budget is mentioned but no specification (such as being included in agencies’ existing budgets)
2 Budget is mentioned but ill-defined (such as there being a recognition of a need for a dedicated budget for the implementation 
of the NAP, but without one being provided)
3 Budget is broadly defined (such as the provision of an overall total amount for the implementation of the NAP)
4 Budget is well-defined (such as each section of activity having a clearly specific budget)
5 Budget is extensively defined (with each individual activity having a corresponding budget line)
Appendix 4: 6-point scale - Budget 
Monitoring and evaluation 
0 No mention of M&E 
1 Mention of M&E but no specification (such as a recognition that M&E is important but without indicating how it will be undertaken)
2 Mention of M&E but ill-defined (may only have some of activities, timeframes and responsible parties, with little detail on that which is 
included)
3 M&E is broadly defined (such as activities broadly defined, timeframes being the duration of the NAP and parties broadly identified)
4 M&E is well defined (such as an indication of two of the three of: specific activities including measurable outcomes, as well as 
timeframes and responsible party/ies).
5 M&E is extensively defined (with a clear and comprehensive specification of specific activities including measurable outcomes, as well 
as timeframes and responsible party/ies).
Appendix 5: 6-point scale - Monitoring  
and Evaluation
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Civil society engagement
0 There is no civil society involvement in the NAP
1 There is a mention of civil society (such as a thank you given on an acknowledgements page but no specification of activity or extent of 
involvement)
2 Civil society involvement is ill-defined (such as a reference to civil society being consulted on the NAP but without any clear indication 
of what that meant)
3 Civil society involvement is clearly defined (such as a reference to civil society being involved in a focus group or a steering committee)
4 Civil society involvement is extensively defined (such as civil society being offered the opportunity to provide feedback on a draft of 
the NAP or providing comprehensive input into the drafting process)
5 Civil society co-drafted the NAP
Appendix 6: 6-point scale - Documented level of 
civil society engagement in the development of 
the NAP 
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